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Abstract
In any final settlement between Israel and the Palesti-
nians, compensation for the material and moral losses of
the Palestinian refugees will be a central feature. The par-
ties have ostensibly agreed that compensation will be paid,
but differ significantly on the principles that will deter-
mine the global amount of compensation, the valuation of
losses, and the method of distribution to the recipients.
Compensation for refugees, for victims of human rights viola-
tions, and for property loss have become well-grounded fea-
tures in contemporary international law. The author
argues that these international law principles should sha-
pe the compensation agreement that will settle the con-
flict, because fairness and transitional justice, rather than
unequal bargaining power, will more readily hasten the
healing of the many wounds that the Palestinians and Is-
raelis have endured.
Résumé
Un aspect central de tout accord final entre Israël et les
Palestiniens sera la compensation pour les pertes maté-
rielles et morales subies par les réfugiés palestiniens. En
apparence, les deux parties sont d’accord pour que des
compensations soient être versées, mais un certain écart
les sépare encore sur la question des principes qui servi-
ront à déterminer la somme globale de la compensation,
la façon d’évaluer les pertes et les méthodes de distribu-
tion aux bénéficiaires. Le droit international contempo-
rain reconnaît pleinement aujourd’hui le droit aux
compensations pour les réfugiés, les victimes de violations
des droits humains et pour ceux qui ont subi des pertes
de biens. L’auteur soutient que ce sont ces mêmes princi-
pes de droit international qui devront façonner l’accord
de compensation qui clôturera le conflit, car c’est l’équité
et la justice transitionnelle plutôt que le pouvoir de mar-
chandage inégal, qui ont le plus de chances de guérir les
nombreuses blessures que Palestiniens et Israéliens ont eu
à subir
I. Introduction
R
eaching a final, durable, and equitable resolution of
the Middle East conflict requires the comprehensive
settlement of the Palestinian refugee issue.1 In its
cornerstone pronouncement on  the  conflict, the  United
Nations Security Council in 1967 called for the just settle-
ment of the refugee problem.2 Israel and the Palestine Libe-
ration Organization acknowledged, in their 1993
Declaration of Principles, that the refugee issue is one of the
most intractable problems at the heart of their aspirations
for peace, and postponed  its  resolution until the future
initiation of final status negotiations.3 Israel has agreed, in
its 1994 peace treaty with Jordan, that the persistence of the
refugee issue over the past five decades has caused massive
human problems in the region, and the settlement of the
issue is to be in accordance with international law.4 Beyond
this, there has been little substantive progress by the parties
towards a final settlement  of the  fate  of the  Palestinian
refugees, and little consensus between them as to the requi-
rements of international law. At the centre of the issue is the
national and individual status of the majority of the estima-
ted 7.6 million  Palestinians in  the world today: the 3.9
million Palestinian refugees who were displaced, personally
or by family lineage, from their homes, properties, and lands
by the 1947-49 and 1967 Middle East wars. The irresolution
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of their fate perpetuates the largest, longest-running and
most destabilizing refugee problem in the world today.
Contemporary legal, political, and diplomatic analyses
of the Palestinian refugee issue have focused on three prin-
cipal components: repatriation, resettlement, and compen-
sation. In current settlement proposals, these three
components are intimately interlinked, but they are each
capable and deserving of stand-alone analysis. Repatriation
focuses on the generally accepted right in international law
of refugees to choose whether to return to their homeland
and their homes following the cessation of conflict or per-
secution.5 Palestinians claim their capacity to exercise this
right of return extends to Israel as well as to a future state
of Palestine,6 while the most liberal position articulated by
official and semi-official Israeli spokespersons have argued
that any  more than  a  very modest number of refugees
returning to their ancestral homes within its borders would
threaten its existential character as a Jewish state.7 Resettle-
ment is the strongly maintained Israeli solution, which
would see all, or almost all, of the estimated 3.9 million
registered Palestinians refugees required to accept perma-
nent civil status of some form in their present homes in
Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan, return to a truncated Palesti-
nian state, or accept relocation elsewhere.8 Palestinians re-
sist this option, arguing that it would abolish their legal
right to return and negate their decades of suffering in
exile.9
The third issue, compensation, focuses on the individual
and collective claims of the Palestinian refugees and the
displaced for the restitution of, and/or indemnification for,
their lost homes and properties in present-day Israel, as well
as monetary damages for related losses. Both sides agree
that compensation should be part of a final peace agree-
ment, but for quite different reasons which would lead to
quite different results. Israel prefers a global collective fund
that would be primarily used for refugee resettlement else-
where and financed largely by international donors. Its
contributions would be made ex-gratis, without assuming
any official liability.10 On the other hand, the Palestinians
advance the compensation issue as a right recognized in
international law that would obligate Israel to return, or pay
for, the refugee properties expropriated or destroyed in
1948 and afterwards. As well, they argue that Israel must
pay damages  for  pain  and suffering, and  for its  use  of
Palestinian properties over the past five decades.11
These differences on compensation are significant. The
gap between the parties goes to a number of issues, inclu-
ding: (i) the legal basis for compensation; (ii) the number
of potential claimants; (iii) the range of compensation cate-
gories; (iv) methods of calculation; (v) whether restitution
forms part of the compensation issue; (vi) whether the
compensation should be awarded collectively or indivi-
dually; and (vii) the status of related issues, such as the
compensation claims of (a) the Arab countries that have
hosted the Palestinian refugees for five decades, and (b) the
Arab Jews who left behind property in their home countries
such as Iraq and Egypt in the 1950s. The differences on
compensation have never been publicly expressed in dollar
figures by Israel or the Palestine Liberation Organization,
but recent assessments by scholars and researchers range
from $5-10 billion (US) by Shlomo Gazit,12 to $15-20
billion in a Harvard refugee project led by Joseph Alpher
and Khalil Shikaki,13 to $271 billion by Atif Kubursi.14
This article focuses on the issue of compensation, which
for these purposes includes restitution.15 Whether the Pale-
stinian refugee issue is eventually resolved through repa-
triation  or resettlement, or  some combination  of both,
compensation will inevitably be a significant feature of the
final agreement. However, if this final agreement is to be
durable, it must reflect the fair aspirations of both parties.
As such, it will have to be anchored in the principles of
international law, and not simply reflect the starkly unequal
bargaining strengths between Israel and the Palestinians. In-
deed, if compensation and restitution are to play a forward-
looking role towards healing the transparent wounds of the
decades-long conflict, and building the foundation for a
prosperous and secure future in the region, then the avai-
lable rules found in international law are both the princi-
pled and the most constructive road to follow.16
II. The Dimensions of the Issue
A. An Historical Précis to 1948
On 29 November 1947, with the British Mandate in Pales-
tine collapsing, the United Nations General Assembly
passed Resolution 181(II).17 It recommended the termina-
tion of the Mandate, the partition of Palestine into inde-
pendent Arab and Jewish states, and a special international
status for Jerusalem. Following months of civil violence, the
State of Israel declared its independence on 14 May 1948,
and a larger war involving the neighbouring Arab countries
ensued. This larger war alternated between periods of in-
tense conflict and unstable truces until the signing of the
Rhodes armistice agreements in 1949. At the conclusion of
the war, Israel was victorious and its land size had expanded
from the 54 per cent of Mandate Palestine allocated to the
Jewish state by UNGA resolution 181(II) to 78 per cent of
the territory.
Between December 1947 and September 1949, approxi-
mately 725,000 Palestinians – more than half of the Arab
population of Palestine – were driven from, or fled, their
homes in that part of Palestine that became Israel.18 They
sought refuge primarily in the neighbouring Arab coun-
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tries, including the West Bank of the Jordan River (occu-
pied by Jordan after 1949), Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and the
Gaza Strip (administered by Egypt after 1949). The first UN
Mediator for Palestine19 and modern historians of the period20
have observed that the Palestinians fled for the same mixture
of reasons that have caused most mass population displace-
ments in the twentieth century: forced expulsions, a wides-
pread fear of harm from advancing armies, and panic after
credible reports of civilian massacres by Israeli militias.
In his September 1948 progress report to the UN Secre-
tary-General, the Mediator for Palestine, Count Folke Ber-
nadotte, urged the United Nations to affirm that the
Palestinian refugees had the right to return to their homes
at the earliest practicable date: “It is, however, undeniable
that no settlement can be just and complete if recognition
is not accorded to the right of the Arab refugee to return to
the home from which he has been dislodged by the hazards
and strategy of the armed conflict between Arabs and Jews
in Palestine.”21 In his listing of the basic premises for an
equitable resolution of the conflict, Count Bernadotte re-
commended that those refugees choosing not to return
should be paid “adequate compensation” for their proper-
ties.22 (This echoed the United Nations’ stipulation in Re-
solution 181(II) the year before that “full compensation”
was to be paid for the expropriation of any Arab land by the
Jewish state.)23 Moreover, he added in his report that Israel
bore the responsibility to indemnify those owners whose
property had been wantonly destroyed during the conflict,
with no qualification as to whether they returned from their
exile or not.24 The day after delivering his report, Count
Bernadotte and an aide were assassinated by the Stern Gang,
an extremist Jewish militia.
The United Nations General Assembly adopted the
thrust of the Bernadotte report in December 1948 in UNGA
Resolution 194.25 In Paragraph 11, the General Assembly
endorsed the report’s recommendations on the right of
return and compensation:
The General Assembly, having considered further the situation
in Palestine…[r]esolves that the refugees wishing to return to
their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be
permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that
compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing
not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under
principles of international law or in equity, should be made
good by the Governments or authorities responsible.
In its resolution, the General Assembly spoke to four
primary features of the compensation question, all of which
flowed directly from the Bernadotte report. First, it stated
that those refugees willing to live at peace with their neigh-
bours were entitled to the restitution of their homes at the
earliest practicable time. Second, those refugees not retur-
ning home should be entitled to compensation for their lost
property. Third, those refugees who do return home and
find their properties damaged or destroyed should be com-
pensated for their losses. And fourth, it explicitly grounded
its direction that the refugees were entitled to repatriation,
restitution, and compensation based upon the principles of
international law and equity. Ironically, while these features
of Resolution 194 would significantly influence the rights
in international law that refugees and victims of human
rights abuses elsewhere could claim in the years to come,
these entitlements have been largely unavailable for the
intended recipients.
B. After 1948
The homes, lands, and properties left behind by the flight of
the Palestinians between 1947 and 49 were substantial. The
United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine
(created by Resolution 194 to resolve the outstanding issues
between Israel, the Palestinians, and the neighbouring Arab
countries)26 estimated in 1951 that almost 80 per cent of
Israel’s total area of 20,850 square kilometres represented
abandoned Arab lands, although only about 28 per cent of
that land was cultivable.27 Approximately 400 Arab villages
and towns, representing most of the Palestinian communi-
ties in the territory assigned to, or captured by Israel, were
occupied and depopulated during the war.28 The transfer of
wealth to Israel in the form of Palestinian lands, homes,
assets, and property was crucial to the new state’s ability to
survive and develop in its formative years.29 Between 1948
and 1953, 350 of the 370 new Jewish settlements created in
Israel were on former Arab property. Don Peretz has esti-
mated that, by 1954, more than one-third of the Israeli
Jewish population were living on former Arab lands, and an
additional 250,000 Israeli Jews, including one-third of the
new immigrants, lived in abandoned Arab urban property.30
In the countryside, where most Palestinians had lived prior
to 1948, enormous tracts of citrus, olive, and other cultivable
properties were expropriated by Israel and turned over to
Jewish agricultural settlements. The importance of these
agricultural lands was critical to the fledging Israeli econo-
my: to cite one example, exports of citrus products from
expropriated Arab groves provided nearly 10 per cent of
Israel’s foreign currency earnings in 1951.31
Israel subsequently legalized the land and property ex-
propriations through legislation that vested broad powers
in  the state-appointed Custodian of  Absentee Property,
who was to hold all of the abandoned properties of the
“absentees” in trust.32 An absentee was defined expansively
as any Arab in Palestine who left his or her home after 29
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November 1947, and the burden of proof that a claimant
was not an absentee fell on the former owner.33 Eventually,
much of the expropriated Palestinian lands and properties
held by the Custodian were transferred via a purchase agree-
ment to an Israeli state development authority, which allowed
the Israeli government to maintain that these properties were
acquired legally (i.e., through payment), even though the
Palestinians owners never received any money.34 This au-
thority, in turn, turned these properties over to the Jewish
National Fund, whose charter explicitly prohibited it from
selling, leasing, or returning the lands to non-Jews. These
steps had the effect of completely severing the proprietary
link between the absentees and their lands.35 Although Pa-
lestinian refugees living in exile and even those displaced
within Israel sought to have their properties returned to
them, very few ever succeeded.36 By the early 1950s, Israel
had so significantly transformed the emptied Palestinian pro-
perties through irreversible steps – such as the levelling of
villages, the settlement of Jewish immigrants into abandoned
homes, and the establishment of kibbutzim and moshavim
(Jewish agricultural settlements) on cultivated Arab farms –
that there was increasingly little of the lands and homes of the
displaced Palestinians which remained in its original state.37
During these early years, Israel was prepared to address
the question of compensation for the abandoned Palesti-
nian properties, but tied its commitment to a number of
pre-conditions that amounted to deal-breakers.38 At the
centre of its position was its insistence that it would not
accept the return of the refugees, and that there would be
no restitution of abandoned Palestinian properties. After
1950, the Israeli authorities developed the argument that
the Jews who left behind their properties in Iraq and other
Middle East countries when they emigrated to Israel con-
stituted a population exchange, which settled any compen-
sation or restitution obligations which it might have owed
to the displaced Palestinians.39 The position of the Arab
countries on compensation was starkly different.40 At the
heart of their argument was the fulfilment of Resolution
194 and the right to repatriate. Only after the free choice of
refugees as to whether to return was exercised, the Arab
states maintained, could the subsequent issue of compen-
sation be determined and implemented. There should be
no linkage with the compensation claims of the Arab Jews,
since their claims had no direct nexus with the Palestinians.
Thus, while both sides accepted the premise of compensa-
tion, no progress was made towards a settlement because of
the larger, intractable issue of repatriation.41 With no agree-
ment, the unresolved fate of the displaced Palestinians was
left to fester as an open political sore that would spark four
more wars, two sustained popular uprisings, and chronic
regional instability over the next five decades.42
III. The Right to Compensation and Restitution
in International Law
A. Introduction
Compensation for refugees and displaced persons, and for
victims of the abuse of internationally recognized human
rights, has evolved into the status of a right in international
law. It has acquired that status because it satisfies the criteria
that are commonly accepted as the formal sources of inter-
national law.43 Applying these criteria, the obligation to pay
compensation to refugees and displaced persons is evident
in the requirements of regional treaties, conventions, and
agreements; in the domestic and international practice of
states; in the rulings of international judicial bodies; in the
consensus among scholars of international law; and in the
repeated pronouncements of the international community
as expressed in the relevant bodies and organs of the United
Nations. While the modern body of rights for refugees and
displaced persons emerged only after the Second World
War, the antecedents of the right to compensation and restitu-
tion are evident even in the nascent years of international law.
The policy justifications for articulating the principle of
compensation and restitution as a right for refugees and
displaced persons in international law are at least five-fold.
First, since modern international law forbids the mass ex-
pulsion of civilian populations even during wars and civil
conflict44 and prohibits the domestic conditions of persecu-
tion that create large-scale refugee displacements,45 com-
pensation is regarded as a potent tool to deter potential
states of origin from domestic actions that would generate
refugees.46 Second, as a principle of equity, countries should
not benefit from proceeds reaped through violating the
human rights of minorities or the nationals of other coun-
tries.47 Third, compensation and restitution serve to repair
some of the individual and/or group dignity lost by the
refugee through the violation of her or his human rights by
mass displacement.48 Fourth, where compensation is asses-
sed and collected against a refugee-generating state, both
the international community and the individual refugees
will have their financial burdens reduced. This would be a
particularly important benefit for refugees, whose movable
and immovable property they lost through the conflict or
persecution they fled from invariably represents the sum
total of their meagre personal wealth.49 And fifth, the com-
pensation principle may assist with the reconciliation of the
parties or  groups to  the conflict that sparked the mass
population displacement, as part of a broader range of
restorative remedies, such as a frank apology, the revelation
of the truth, substantial reforms to political and social
institutions, public educational campaigns to transform atti-
tudes, and substantial changes to employment patterns.50
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B. The Origins of the Right to Compensation in
International Law
Prior to the emergence of modern human rights, humani-
tarian, and refugee law in the immediate aftermath of the
Second World War, compensation and restitution for dis-
placed persons had already been a regular practice in inter-
national treaties and state practice (although not in a
consistent manner nor with the agreed-upon compensation
obligations always being honoured). For example, in the
aftermath of the American War of Independence, 60,000
American colonialists loyal to the British crown fled their
homes  and properties in the newly independent United
States. In the 1794 Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Naviga-
tion (the “Jay Treaty”)51 between Great Britain and the Uni-
ted States, the Americans agreed that the Loyalists could
claim either the restitution of their properties or compensa-
tion for their property and commercial losses.52 However,
the subsequent deterioration of political relations between
the two countries resulted in the American abdication of any
responsibility to pay the Loyalist claims.
Similar examples of early European and international
treaties and laws that recognized compensation and/or
restitution claims for displaced civilians include the 1648
Treaty of Westphalia that ended the Thirty Years War;53 the
1678 Treaty of Nimmegeun between Spain and France that
ended the war over the Spanish Netherlands;54 and the 1839
Treaty of London that guaranteed the independence and
neutrality of Belgium,55 among others.56 Even treaties that
legitimized mass displacement of civilians and population
exchanges (actions that are now prohibited by international
law57) – such as the 1920 Treaty of Neuilly between Greece
and Bulgaria,58 and the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne between
Greece and Turkey59 – contained provisions to compensate
civilians who lost properties.
The modern basis for compensation and restitution in
international law has been decisively shaped by the seminal
1928 ruling of the Permanent Court of International Justice
in Chorzow Factory.60 In the aftermath of World War One,
the Polish government expropriated a German-owned fac-
tory on Polish territory, and the German government
sought reparations  on behalf of the owners. In its lead
ruling on the merits, the World Court stated that state
responsibility applies in the case of an act or omission in
violation of an international legal obligation:
It is a principle of international law, and even a general concep-
tion of law,  that  any breach of an engagement invokes an
obligation to make reparation. [R]eparation is the indispensa-
ble complement of a failure to apply a convention, and there is
no necessity for this to be stated in the convention itself.61
Regarding damages, the Court endorsed the principle of
restitution first, and full compensation for the property
owners where restitution was unobtainable. In addition, it
stated that awards for other damages not covered by resti-
tution and compensation were also available:
The essential principle contained in the actual notion of an
illegal act – a principle which seems to be established by inter-
national practice and in particular by the decisions of arbitral
tribunals – is that reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out
all the consequences of the illegal act and re-establish the situa-
tion which would, in all probability, have existed if the act had
not been committed.  Restitution in kind,  or, if this is not
possible, payment of a sum corresponding to the value which a
restitution in kind would bear; the award, if need be, of damages
sustained which would not be covered by restitution in kind or
payment in place of it – such are the principles which should
serve to determine the amount of compensation due for an act
contrary to international law.62
Although Chorzow Factory was decided as a commercial
property action in private international law, its articulation
of the principles on compensation have since been widely
endorsed in various public international law decisions.
These endorsements include leading judgments on dama-
ges for injuries to United Nations personnel63 and repara-
tions for human rights violations,64 as well as by a seminal
United Nations study on compensation for human rights
violations.65
C. Resolution 194 and the Articulation of the Right to
Compensation
United Nations General Assembly Resolution 194, which
established the availability of return, compensation, and
restitution for the Palestinian refugees, was the world com-
munity’s first affirmation of these principles in the context
of a displaced population. Resolution 194 is commonly cited
by refugee law scholars as a primary international law source
for the right of refugees and displaced persons anywhere in
the world to compensation and restitution.66 Two particular
features of Resolution 194 embed it with an international
law importance that distinguishes it from the limited legal
scope of an ordinary General Assembly resolution.
First, Resolution 194 explicitly states that the repatria-
tion, compensation and restitution of the refugees should
be made according to “… principles of international law or
in equity.” Luke Lee argues that, by deliberately choosing
this particular drafting, the General Assembly clearly si-
gnalled that it was restating pre-existing law on the principle
of compensating wrongs in international law, rather than
simply establishing a new legal obligation.67 As such, the
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resolution moves beyond the recommendatory and politi-
cal character of most General Assembly resolutions and
acquires a legal, binding nature. Its binding effect arises not
from the resolution itself, but from the declared law, which
is then obligatory upon all states, whether they voted in
favour of the resolution or not.68
Second, the resolution has been repeatedly affirmed by
the General Assembly. Since 1948, Resolution 194 has been
reaffirmed or referred to, by near unanimous majorities, at
least 140 times.69 For instance, UNGA Resolution 53/51,
voted on 3 December 1998, expressly cited Resolution 194
when endorsing the entitlement of Palestinian refugees “to
their property and to the income derived therefrom, in
conformity with the principles of justice and equity.”70
Resolution 53/51, like its many predecessor resolutions,
was passed by an overwhelming majority, in this case 156
member countries in favour and only two (Israel and the
United States) in opposition. International law scholars
have stated that, in specific circumstances, the repeated
affirmation of a resolution by unanimous or overwhelming
majorities of the General Assembly endows it with an ac-
quired legal character, particularly when it reflects the pa-
rallel development of state practice on the issue.71 Leading
judgments of the World Court have endorsed this approach.72
D. General Principles of Domestic Law
A leading source for international law are the general principles
ofdomestic law widely accepted by thedeveloped legal systems,
insofar as they apply to international rights and obligations.73
The principles of compensation and restitution have been
cornerstone features of  most  domestic  legal systems  for
centuries,74 and constitute the primary remedial response to
repairprovendamages and instancesofunjustenrichment.For
example, the English common law courts have long applied the
principle; in Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Fairbairn Lawson
Combe Barbour Ltd., Lord Wright stated in 1943 that:
It is clear that any civilized system of law is bound to provide
remedies for cases of what has been called unjust enrichment or
unjust benefit, that is to prevent a man from retaining the
money of or some benefit derived from another which it is
against conscience that he should keep.75
Similarly,  the American Law Institute,  in its  seminal
restatement of the domestic law on restitution, has estab-
lished that: “A person who has been unjustly enriched at
the expense of another is required to make restitution to
that other.”76
E. International Treaties and Conventions
Through treaties and conventions, international law has
accepted the cornerstone principle that a state which has
violated a legal obligation is required to end the violation
and to make reparation, including restitution and compen-
sation for loss and injury in the appropriate circumstances.77
These international instruments also stipulate that those
whose human rights have been breached are to have access
to meaningful remedies. Article 8 of the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights states that every individual is entitled
to an “effective remedy,”78 a requirement that is repeated in
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights79 and
the Declaration on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial
Discrimination.80 Other human rights instruments are even
more specific: the American Convention on Human Rights
refers to a “right to be compensated in accordance with
the law”81 and provides that “no one shall be deprived of his
property except  upon  payment  of just  compensation,”82
while the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights
establishes the “right to an adequate compensation.”83 The
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights84 and the
European Convention on Human Rights85 both refer to the
“enforceable right to compensation.” The 1998 Treaty of
Rome,86 which established the International Criminal Court,
has directed the new court to establish principles of resti-
tution, compensation, and rehabilitation for victims of
international war crimes. Other international treaties and
conventions contain similar remedial requirements.87
Theo van Boven, a Special Rapporteur for the United
Nations Commission on Human Rights, issued a compre-
hensive final report in 1993 on international law remedies
arising from the violation of human rights norms.88 After
reviewing a number of international treaties and conven-
tions, he stated: “the principal right [that human rights]
victims are entitled to under international law is the right
to effective remedies and just reparations.”89 In his conclu-
sion, the Special Rapporteur said: “it is…an imperative
norm of justice that… the rights of the victims be sustained
to the fullest possible extent.”90 These remedies included
restitution, compensation, rehabilitation and guarantees of
non-repetition,91 and would be claimed against the state
perpetrating the violations. Among the human rights and
fundamental freedoms – whose gross violation would trig-
ger a claim for remedies under international law – that van
Boven listed were “deportation or forcible transfer of po-
pulation”.92 The Special Rapporteur also maintained that
international law contains no statute of limitations for
claims regarding human rights reparations.93
F. Contemporary International Law Rulings
Decisions by international legal courts and tribunals, particu-
larly since the 1980s, have affirmed that compensation and
restitution are available remedies for displaced persons and
victims of human rights abuses. Using both the 1928 World
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Court decision in Chorzow Factory and international human
rights treaties as the legal foundation for the principle, such
international judicial bodies as the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights have
ruled that violations of international obligations which result
in harm create an obligation to compensate for and repair the
damages. The Inter-American Court has stated that:
It is a principle of international law, which jurisprudence has
considered “even a general concept of law”, that every violation
of an international obligation which results in harm creates a
duty to make adequate reparation. Compensation, on the other
hand, is the most usual way of doing it.94
In 1989, the Inter-American Court ruled in Velasquez-
Rodriguez v. Honduras,95 a case under the American Con-
vention on Human Rights96 involving state responsibility for
the disappearance of Honduran citizens, that international
law requires restitution of the status quo ante where possi-
ble, and compensation where it is not possible.97 After
finding Honduras liable for human rights violations, the
Court held that the claimants were entitled to a broad range
of compensation headings under international law, as per
the “fair  compensation” criteria in Article 63(1) of  the
Convention. These headings included damages for lost sa-
laries, based on probable future earnings, and moral dama-
ges, based upon the emotional harm suffered by the families
of the victims. The Court emphasized that the “fair com-
pensation” criteria must be applied in “sufficiently broad
terms in order to compensate, to the extent possible, for the
loss suffered.”98 These compensation principles have been
regularly applied by the Inter-American Court in sub-
sequent decisions.99
In a similar manner, the European Court of Human
Rights has ruled under the European Convention on Human
Rights100 that the deprivation of property and human rights
obligates the offending state to provide restitution and
compensation for the claimant. In Loizidou v. Turkey,101 a
Greek Cypriot national with property holdings in the
northern part of Cyprus occupied by Turkey since 1974
complained that she was prevented from returning to her
lands and peacefully enjoying them. The Court found that
Turkey was responsible, as the occupying power, for
breaching the Convention, and rejected its arguments that
its stated need to rehouse displaced Turkish Cypriot refu-
gees justified the negation of Ms. Loizidou’s property
rights. At the remedial stage,102 the European Court ruled
that the claimant was still the legal owner of the property,
and entitled to reclaim her lands at any time. As reparations,
it awarded compensation for ground rent (based on the
market value earnings that could have been realized but for
the occupation), moral damages for the loss of property
enjoyment, and costs and interest.
More recently, the European Commission of Human
Rights issued a 1999 report103 on Cyprus, where it applied
the principles in Loizidou regarding the claims of other
displaced Greek Cypriots to property restitution and com-
pensation. The Commission unanimously found that Tur-
key remained in continuing breach of the European
Convention on Human Rights because of its ongoing refusal
to allow Greek Cypriots to return to their homes in north-
ern Cyprus. It also ruled that Turkey’s refusal to pay com-
pensation for its interference with the claimants’ property
rights breached the Convention. Turkey’s defence that pro-
perty succession legislation enacted by the Turkish Repu-
blic of North Cyprus invalidated the property claims was
rejected by the Commission, as was its argument that pro-
perty restitution and compensation should await a future
global settlement of the Cyprus issue.104
G. Contemporary State and International Practice
Recent state and international practice have provided rich
examples of restitution and compensation for violations of
property and human rights. Many modern treaties and
agreements that ended international or national conflicts
have included these principles in the final settlement. Simi-
larly, most countries in Eastern and Central Europe in the
1990s have offered restitution and compensation for those
who lost properties or suffered human rights abuses under
fascism or communism. As well, there are a number of
contemporary domestic examples where these remedial
principles have been applied as a restorative step to address
a troubled history between majority and minority popula-
tions.
The template for the modern international obligation to
compensate for unilateral property confiscations and wide-
scale human rights abuses has been the post-war German
and European reparations for Jewish and other victims of
Nazi persecution.105 Following the 1952 Luxembourg Agree-
ment106 between the Federal Republic of Germany, Israel,
and the Conference on Jewish Material Claims against Ger-
many, the West German government enacted a series of
laws to provide compensation for gross violations of human
rights (such as loss of life, loss of health, forced labour,
deportation, imprisonment, maltreatment, and degrada-
tion) and for property losses (including immovable and
moveable property, capital, income, securities, mortgages,
pensions, copyright and patents) for victims or their
heirs.107 These compensation payments have amounted to
DM 100 billion up to the year 2000, payable to Holocaust
survivors, both individually and through the State of Israel.
The range of compensable claims for Nazi victims has been
Volume 21 Refuge Number 2

steadily widened through the decades to include Swiss bank
accounts, European insurance policies, looted works of art,
and slave labour.108 Other European countries, such as
Austria, Norway, Denmark, and the Netherlands have also
undertaken to offer compensation to Jewish and other
victims of Nazism.109 And with the fall of communism in
Eastern Europe, procedures have been created in a number
of countries – including Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and the
Czech Republic – to restore property confiscated either by
fascist or communist regimes to Jewish and other dispos-
sessed owners.110 After German reunification in 1990, the
German parliament enacted legislation to restore confisca-
ted Jewish properties in the former East Germany to their
original owners or heirs, and to award the proceeds from
the sales of communal and unclaimed Jewish property to
the Jewish Claims Conference in order to aid needy Holo-
caust survivors worldwide.111
In Bosnia, a centrepiece of the 1995 Dayton Peace Agree-
ment112 that brought the first war in the former Yugoslavia
to an uneasy end was the provision that all refugees and
displaced persons would have the right to return home and
have their properties restored to them. Alternatively, com-
pensation for properties was available for those that either
could not, or did not wish to, return to them.113 The Dayton
Agreement established a Commission for Displaced Persons
and Refugees, later renamed the Commission for Real Pro-
perty Claims of Displaced Persons and Refugees, to adjudi-
cate real property claims, including the return of the
confiscated property, or, in lieu of return, the awarding of
“just compensation.”114 Compensation may be awarded in
the form of money or in the form of a bond for the future
purchase of real property elsewhere in Bosnia. For a variety
of international and inter-ethnic reasons, the Dayton com-
pensation  provisions have been  only  implemented in a
piecemeal fashion, as the legal structures to adjudicate the
claims await the realization of political will.115 In a related
legal process, an international human rights chamber in
Sarajevo has declared that displaced property owners in
Bosnia are entitled to be compensated for the unlawful
eviction from their residence, through declaratory relief
and moral damages, based upon the European Convention
on Human Rights.116
As part of the recent resolution of other international
and domestic conflicts, compensation and restitution have
been integral parts of the settlement process. In the after-
math of the Second Gulf War in 1990–91, the United
Nations established a compensation commission to process
claims and pay out compensation for property, personal,
and moral  losses resulting from the  Iraqi invasion and
occupation of Kuwait.117 The Iraq-Kuwait compensation
experience built upon the lessons of the Iran-United States
Claims Tribunal, created in 1981 to adjudicate the Ameri-
can claims for property and material losses following the
1979 Islamic revolution in Iran.118 In Guatemala, the agree-
ments in the early 1990s that brought an end to the four-
decades-old civil war stipulated property restitution and
compensation to land owners who fled the country during the
armed conflict.119 Domestically, compensation has played a
role in repairing the civil rights  violations  of Japanese-
Americans120 and Japanese-Canadians121 for their arbitrary
detention and property confiscation during  the Second
World War. Similarly, the tools of compensation and pro-
perty restoration have shaped the modern attempts of the
United States,122 Canadian,123 Australian,124 and New Zea-
land125 governments to restitute their aboriginal peoples for
the centuries of land alienation and social harm that these
states inflicted upon them. After the fall of oppressive mi-
litary dictatorships in Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, and U-
ganda, the new democratic governments enacted legislation
that offered compensation and, where possible, restitution
for victims of human rights abuses and property losses by
the previous regimes.126
IV. Restitution, Compensation and the
Palestinians
International law authoritatively establishes that restitution
and compensation are available remedies for those who have
been displaced or turned into refugees through acts contrary
to international treaties and conventions, for those who have
suffered gross violations of their internationally recognized
human rights, and for those who have lost homes or proper-
ty through the breach of internationally established stand-
ards. In the case of the Middle East conflict, the Palestinians
who became refugees, who lost properties, or who suffered
other legally recognized damages as a consequence of the
various upheavals in the region – and particularly the
1947–49 and 1967 wars – also have an established legal
grounding for restitution and compensation in the substan-
tial body of United Nations resolutions that specifically refer
to their claims. Indeed, it would be difficult to find another
community of disadvantaged people for whom the modern
principles of international law – especially in the fields of
human rights and refugee law – so clearly buttress their claim
either to have their properties restored to them or to receive
appropriate compensation for their losses.
Establishing the entitlement to compensation and resti-
tution as a right in international law is one matter. Articu-
lating the detail of substance and procedure that must
invariably accompany the realization of this right is quite
another. As a  body of  principles, international law  has
become a mature legal system, deserving of the consider-
able respect it enjoys in the modern world because of its
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impressive assembly of the values that the international
community has declared it wishes to live by. But, as a guide
to the efficacious application of these principles, the prac-
tice of international law has been considerably less sophis-
ticated. Its application of these principles has been an
inchoate array of uneven experiences, shaped by two pri-
mary factors: (i) the poverty of political will to implement
these principles in a manner consistent with the international
rule of law; and (ii) the wide variety and real differences
among the many contemporary experiences where the
application on international law has been attempted. Deve-
loping the practical rules to implement an international
right – such as the entitlement to restitution and compen-
sation – has, in many cases, been an original creation, an ad
hoc arrangement. Yet, increasingly, this need not be so. The
accumulation of international experience has reached the
point where sufficient precedents and rules exist, particu-
larly on restitution and compensation, to productively and
equitably craft their implementation in any contemporary
situation.
The Palestinian claims for restitution and compensation
are neither exceptional nor insurmountable. The only subs-
tantive obstacle is political will. While the circumstances of
the Palestinians present some particular challenges – which
is unsurprising, given  their  massive  displacement, their
enormous personal, property, and moral losses, the sub-
sequent transformation of their homes and lands, the array
of international political actors involved, and the extraor-
dinary length of time involved – recent international and
domestic practice from elsewhere points to applicable rules
that can be successfully adapted to untie this Gordian knot.
In anticipation that the negotiations between the Israeli and
Palestinian representatives will eventually turn to the issues
of compensation and restitution, five aspects of the issue
stand out that will form a significant feature of the parties’
final settlement of the rights of the Palestinians. While these
five aspects are all worthy of an extended discussion, they can,
for the purposes of this essay, only be reviewed briefly.127
A. Return and Compensation
Modern international law, beginning with the proclamation
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in December
1948, has insisted that refugees and displaced persons, as
well as their descendants, have the right to return to their
homes, if that is their freely determined choice.128 The Hu-
man Rights Committee, the United Nations body responsi-
ble for interpreting the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, stated in 1999 that “there are few, if any,
circumstances in which deprivation of the right to enter
one’s own country could be reasonable.”129 The right to
return survives even when sovereignty over the lands from
where the displaced had fled is contested or has changed
hands. Those unable to return to a former home because it
is occupied by an innocent third party or has been destroyed
are entitled to choose return to the vicinity or to receive
compensation. However, international law holds that com-
pensation is not a substitute for the right to return to one’s
home.130 To that end, the ensuing discussion on restitution
and compensation is to be seen in the context of remedies
adjacent to the right to return, not in place of it.
B. Types of Compensation
According to international law and practice, the Palestinians
eligible for restitution and compensation have a range of
remedies available to them, including: (i) the restitution of
their confiscated movable and immovable properties; (ii)
compensation for the damages to their restituted properties;
(iii) compensation for the income derived from the use of
their restituted properties; (iv) compensation for those re-
fugees and displaced who choose not to return; and (v)
damages for a spectrum of non-material losses, including
lost earnings and opportunities, and social and moral dama-
ges. In addition, collective restitution claims are available
for: (i) expropriated religious, educational, communal, and
public lands; and (ii) the use and depletion of natural resour-
ces, such as water, minerals, and forests. Technically, the
accomplishment of these remedies within the regional con-
text is feasible, because the extensive historical documenta-
tion on property and ownership in Palestine has been largely
preserved. The land records assembled by the British Man-
date authority, the United Nations CCP, the Israeli Custo-
dian of Absentees’ Property, and the Israeli Lands Authority,
as well as the personal records of the families of the displaced
and refugees, would make compensation an easier technical
task in comparison  to the  successful claims  achieved in
recent years by victims of European fascism and by the
aboriginal nations in North America, Australia, and New
Zealand.
Politically, the types of compensation awarded would
depend on the prior determination of how many of the
displaced Palestinians would achieve the right to return to
Israel and have their original properties restored to them.
Palestinian researchers have maintained that the total com-
pensation pricetag would be significantly reduced if a grea-
ter number of displaced and refugees were able to return to
their homes inside Israel.131 However, discussions within
the status quo framework indicate that a final settlement on
the Palestinian refugee issue will consist largely of compen-
sation in exchange for the negation of the large-scale right
to return. The leading example is the 1995 Beilin-Abu
Mazan agreement,132 where a future Israeli justice minister
and a senior advisor to the Palestinian Authority developed
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an unofficial, but influential, template for a final status
settlement. It accepted the right of the displaced Palesti-
nians to compensation and rehabilitation for their material
and moral losses, while excluding any significant return of,
or to, their properties within Israel. The issue of restitution
was raised at the January 2001 final status talks in Taba,
where the Israelis rejected any return of refugee proper-
ty.133 How the parties to the final status negotiations will
square any agreement that dissolves the right of Palesti-
nian refugees to return to their original lands with the
cornerstone principle in international refugee and human
rights law that refugees have a right to freely choose
repatriation back to their homeland will be a closely
observed matter.
C. Valuation of Losses
International law requires that compensation for internatio-
nally recognized losses should, as much as remedies can,
place the claimants back in the position that they would have
been in, had the breach of the legal right not occurred.
Beyond that, it has not spoken with particular clarity regar-
ding the precise formula to use, employing at different times
the terms “full,” “just,” “fair,” and “adequate” to describe
the compensation required. While “full compensation” is an
appropriate yardstick in international claims of small and
medium size, large-scale claims – because their size creates
problems of efficiency, fairness, and cost – have tended
towards less-than-global “attainable justice” standards. In-
deed, the larger and more complex the potential claim, the
more likely it has been that the final compensation arrange-
ment will be a judicious mixture of political feasibility (i.e.,
available financial resources and domestic public reaction)
and the requirements of justice (i.e., international legal obli-
gations,  international pressure, and the cost of  ongoing
dissent by the aggrieved party). “Attainable justice,” while
necessarily falling short of “full compensation,” is an accept-
able and appropriate standard in large-scale international
claims where: (i) the aggrieved party freely agrees to the
settlement or it  is the result of a  legal process that  the
aggrieved party has freely agreed to adhere to; (ii) the com-
pensation addresses all of the recognized losses; (iii) inter-
nationally accepted means of valuation for the losses are
employed; and (iv) the party responsible for the compensa-
tion of the losses undertakes a guarantee of non-repetition.
However, with whatever valuation standard is chosen, inter-
national law requires that it is to be given a broad applica-
tion, so that the restorative purposes of human rights
remedies – which include justice, equity, acknowledgement
of responsibility, deterrence, reconciliation, and social har-
mony – are achieved.
D. Creating an Appropriate Compensation Regime
A number of issues arise in choosing the modalities of a
compensation regime for resolving the Middle East conflict.
The principal issues include:
1. The group  of  claimants. The choices for  appropriate
claimant groups would include:
a. The 1948 property owners and their heirs, which
would award those who suffered direct losses, but
would disproportionally benefit land-owners, and
disadvantage the poor and women (who frequently
could not own or inherent property),134 as well as
require personal documentary evidence which may
not always exist;
b. The extended family or villages, which reflects the
traditional rural social units and may resolve some
problems surrounding claims over collective lands,
but could create problems in determining member-
ship, and would not address the landless or gender
inequity issues;
c. Per capita awards for all the displaced, regardless of
property ownership, which would address the ine-
quality and gender issues, but would still require a
determination of eligibility; or
d. A collective claim made on behalf of the displaced
by the Palestinian state, which would create a natio-
nal fund for future public works, but would not
likely provide the kind of political and emotional
closure for the displaced that an individual compen-
sation scheme should provide.
2. Formula. The choices among appropriate compensa-
tion formulas would include:
a. A claims-based system that bases compensation
upon the value of the lost property, which would
most directly link the financial remedies to the actual
losses, but would also likely recreate the inequalities of
pre-1948 Palestinian society;
b. A modified claims-based system that creates several
compensation categories based upon size of claim,
which would be more  efficient and award more
progressive  remedies  than the  pure  claims-based
system, but would also still be biased towards larger
property owners;
c. A pure per capita payment system that would award
equal payments to all refugees, thereby achieving
efficiency and eliminating the social inequalities of
the previous proposals, but would diminish the link
between payments and scale of losses; or
d. A modified per capita payment system that would
create several categories of claimants based upon a
generational or returnee v. non- returnee  status,
which would still be efficient and relative equitable,
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but which could also create social tension between
the categories.
3. Mechanism. What forms would compensation be awar-
ded? Among the choices would be:
a. Cash payments, which are efficient to administer,
but may not have significant macro-social or econo-
mic benefits;
b. Services or vouchers for individuals or families,
which can be directed towards more focused public
benefits plans, but are less flexible for the recipients
and weaken the link between the compensation and
actual losses;
c. Investment in community development, which also
promotes public benefit plans, but weakens the link
between the displaced and the purpose of the com-
pensation; or
d. A  equity scheme  involving  refugee ownership in
collective development projects, which more direc-
tly connects the displaced to public plans, but does
not strongly address the personal needs for closure.
4. Administrative Process. How should the compensation
fund be administered and distributed? Several political-
ly feasible types of bodies are possible, including:
a. Palestinian state, which may build up the governing
expertise of the future state, but which also raises
issues of accountability and fairness;
b. A bilateral body made up of Palestine and Israel,
which would involve the main parties to the conflict,
but would invite administrative gridlock because of
their historical animosity;
c. A trilateral commission, involving Palestine, Israel
and another party, which would lessen but not likely
eliminate the problems of a bilateral commission; or
d. An international commission of parties acceptable
to Palestine and Israel, or a United Nations commis-
sion, which would likely avoid gridlock, but would
not be directly accountable to the direct stakehol-
ders.
4. Compensation Determination. How should a global fig-
ure be determined? Among the approaches would in-
clude:
a. A politically determined number that is largely sha-
ped through the course of the final status negotia-
tions by the amount of money that the international
community and Israel are willing to pay. While this
is doubtlessly the easiest method to achieve a glo-
bal figure, it would have little to do with the
international legal obligation to provide fair com-
pensation;
b. A macro-economic survey that would evaluate the
assets as a prelude to determining an estimated value.
While this approach would approximate a fair value
of the Palestinian losses, it also underestimates the
degree of economic loss by minimizing the appre-
ciation of value over the years since dispossession,
as well as downplaying moral losses; or
c. A multiplier approach, which would start with the
estimated value and scale of the confiscated proper-
ties in 1948, and then add accepted appreciation
factors to determine present-day value. This appro-
ach would come the closest to the “fair compensa-
tion” requirements, but, given the scale of
Palestinian losses, it would doubtlessly be the most
difficult method to fund.
At the unsuccessful Taba final status talks in January
2001, the Palestinian and Israeli negotiators agreed on se-
veral of the less contentious issues pertaining to compensa-
tion.135 Within the context of a comprehensive agreement,
an International Commission and an International Fund
would be created to conclusively settle all outstanding com-
pensation issues pertaining to Palestinian material and
non-material losses. Also agreed upon would be a multi-
track assessment system, where smaller claims below a
certain monetary ceiling would be determined through a
fast-track procedure. As well, Israel would accept some
moral and financial responsibility for compensation, al-
though no amount was seriously discussed. However, left
unsettled by the time the Taba talks broke down was any
agreement on the central questions of how the overall
amount of compensation would be calculated, who would
fund it, how the funds would be equitably distributed, and
whether there would be separate parcels of funds for indi-
vidual compensation and national projects.
E. Who Should Pay?
International law provides that the state, body, or individual
who causes the damage or harm in breach of an internatio-
nally recognized obligation is liable for the restitution and
compensation. In this case, Israel would bear the primary
responsibility for compensation, because it either created
and perpetuated the Palestinian refugee problem in defiance
of international law, or on the lesser ground that – regardless
of moral blame – it has been unjustly enriched through its
expropriation and use of Palestinian properties, homes, and
lands. Payments by Israel to meet its compensatory obliga-
tions could take the form of direct restitution (the return of
homes and properties, which would likely lessen its potential
total liabilities), the handing over of the settlements, roads,
and other structures built in the West Bank and Gaza, and
the financial contribution to a compensation fund. While
Israel is an economically advanced nation – with a per capita
income of over $18,000 (U.S.), it is almost twenty times the
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level of the Palestinian economy – even its financial capacity
is unlikely to entirely satisfy the requirements of a final
compensation fund by itself. For a variety of complex real-
politik and practical reasons, the international community
(primarily Europe and North America) would likely con-
tribute to a compensation fund, which would enhance
their voice in shaping the modalities of the compensation
regime.
V. Conclusion
To satisfy the direction of the international community that
the Palestinian refugee problem is to be settled in accordance
with the principles of justice and equity, international law
mandates that they are entitled to restitution and compen-
sation for their losses. These losses attributable to Israel in
violation of its international law obligations are substantial,
and arise from: the expulsion or flight of over half of the
Palestinian population; the confiscation of approximately
16,000 square kilometres of land, representing almost 80 per
cent of Mandate Palestine; the large-scale expropriation or
destruction of Palestinian property; the refusal to allow the
refugees to return to their homes; the suffering caused by the
losses and the decades in exile; and unjust enrichment from
the use of the confiscated properties. Although international
law does not speak with precision regarding the formulas to
be applied in such a large-scale and complex claim, it has
clearly stipulated a number of principles that are directly
applicable in any future final-status agreement between Pa-
lestine and Israel, including: (i) Restitution of the wrongly
acquired property enjoys primacy, with compensation avai-
lable for property damage and unjust enrichment; (ii) Com-
pensation in place of restitution  is acceptable, but only
where restitution has become impossible for practical rea-
sons; (iii) Compensation is available for both individual and
community losses, and covers remedies for the loss or da-
mage to immovable and movable property; for loss of actual
income and future earning potential; for moral damages,
including emotional harm; for unjust enrichment; for the
costs of rehabilitation; and for an undertaking that such
actions will not be repeated; (iv) however the legal formula
for compensation has been phrased – be it “full,” “fair,”
“adequate,” etc. – it is to be given a sufficiently broad appli-
cation so that  the  restorative purposes  of human rights
remedies are fulfilled; (v) The state actor that displaced the
indigenous population and unjustly benefited from the con-
fiscated properties is the party responsible for restitution
and compensation; and (vi)  The responsible state actor
cannot argue that the difficulties of process – those caused
by the passage of time, the magnitude of potential claimants,
the determination of worthy claimants, the calculation of
outstanding damages, the existence of subsequent domestic
legislation that has transferred legal title, the hostile mood
among the domestic political constituency, or the lack of a
comprehensive settlement to the wider conflict – are justi-
fiable barriers to satisfying an otherwise established claim
for restitution and compensation.
The lessons of reconciliation in the modern world are
profound. Those on both sides of  an historical  wound
benefit immensely from a genuine effort to acknowledge,
remember, and restore. While full justice may not have
been achieved even in the template cases of post-war Europe
or contemporary South Africa, the transformation of rela-
tions and the flourishing of new values among these former
nemeses have been substantially aided by the restorative
remedies of restitution and compensation. In the Middle
East, the closure of the decades-long conflict will require no
less. For Israelis, offering these remedies will finally allow a
reckoning with the uncomfortable history that still stares
out from among the ruined homes and wild olive groves
that can be found in every corner of their country. For
Palestinians, accepting the remedies of restitution and
compensation will not return some past Eden, but it will
address not only the sufferings they have endured and the
material possessions they have lost, but also provide the
tools for a productive national future. The requirements of
an enduring regional peace require no less.
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